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Unifying the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina – 
mission completed?
Unifikace Ozbrojených sil Bosny a Hercegoviny – proces 
sjednocování
Věra Stojarová
Abstract: The Armed Forces of BiH were officially unified in 2005 and are composed 
of two founding armies: the Bosniak-Croat Army of the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Army of Republika Srpska. 
Even though the unified armed forces celebrated their 13th anniversary 
in December 2018 and are presented as a success story, the political 
environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in Republika Srpska, 
does not foster a sense of unity in the armed forces. The paper explores 
the vulnerabilities that the unified armed forces face, particularly in 
relation to the process of state building in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
text concludes, that the main concerns for the BiH armed forces include 
the old equipment, the economic problems of the country and budget 
constraints, politicisation and ethnicisation – while ongoing nationalism 
and the unsure future of BiH remain the greatest external challenges.
Abstrakt: Ozbrojené síly Bosny a Hercegoviny byly oficiálně sjednoceny v roce 2005 
a byly složeny ze dvou zakládajících složek: Armády FBiH a Armády RS. 
I když sjednocené ozbrojené síly oslavily v prosinci 2018 své třinácté výro-
čí a jsou prezentovány velice pochvalně, politické prostředí v Bosně a Her-
cegovině, zejména v Republice srbské, nepřispívá k pocitu jednoty ozbro-
jených sil. Článek se bude zabývat výzvami sjednocených ozbrojených sil 
ve vztahu k procesu state-buildingu v postkonfliktní Bosně a Hercegovině. 
K hlavním obavám ozbrojených sil Bosny a Hercegoviny patří staré vyba-
vení, ekonomické problémy země a rozpočtová omezení, politizace a et-
nicizace; přetrvávající nacionalismus a nejistá budoucnost Bosny a Herce-
goviny zůstávají největšími vnějšími problémy.
Keywords: Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bosnia and Hercegovina; 
Dayton Peace Agreement. 
Klíčová slova: Ozbrojené síly Bosny a Hercegoviny; Bosna a Hercegovina; Daytonská 
mírová smlouva. 
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INTRODUCTION
The outcome of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was de facto a divided coun-
try and a divided military, and the prospect of unifying the three ethnically-based armies 
into a single command and control structure seemed utopian. However, the existence of 
three separate armies was not only a heavy burden for the country’s budget, but meant 
that the units which had fought against each other during the conflict remained separate 
and would never be able to fight under a unified command. The continuous violence 
towards returnees, ongoing weapons smuggling and the protests of civilians unhappy 
with the economic and political transition, helped to strengthen the efforts for demobil-
isation, cutting the army budgets and final unification. International actors (OHR, OSCE 
and Nato in particular) helped BiH to establish the Ministry of Defence in 2004 and the 
unified Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) in 2006. This was probably the 
greatest achievement in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. BiH determined to reduce 
its military personnel drastically; to unify the armed forces; and to join the Partnership 
for Peace programme with the final goal of Nato accession. The process of unifying the 
armed forces was concluded 13 years ago. The question remains of whether the process 
was successful and whether it is possible to speak of unified armed forces under a uni-
fied command; and exclude armed conflict in future. 
Existing scholarly accounts of security reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina suggest that 
a unified military in the country is still an oxymoron. The paper looks closely at the phe-
nomenon of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and tries to assess the chal-
lenges they face. The text also looks at the nexus between the AFBiH and the security 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina itself and of the region at large. The primary legislation deal-
ing with the defence sector was used as a primary source; several country analyses by 
different authors were used as secondary sources. Multiple semi-structured interviews 
with security experts from the Balkan region were undertaken and several surveys un-
dertaken to obtain a better understanding of the issue. My argument is that the Armed 
Forces of BiH are far from unified and, unless the country unites, the military cannot 
be expected to do so. The paper is structured as follows: in the first part the process of 
unifying the Armed Forces of BiH is outlined; the second section is devoted to BiH’s Nato 
membership aspirations and AFBiH’s engagement in the country and abroad; while the 
third section is devoted to the political, social, economic and other challenges faced by 
the BiH military.
1 PROCESS OF UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF BIH
The Dayton Peace Agreement did not only bring an end to the armed conflict but also 
resulted in spontaneous demobilisation. Some 370,000 troops under arms (out of an 
estimated 430,000) left the armed forces in the subsequent five years. The planned de-
mobilisation started three years later. In 1999, the budget for military expenditure was 
drastically cut by 39% over the years 1999/2000 and both entities – the Federation of 
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BiH and Republika Srpska (RS) – agreed to reduce military personnel by 15% in 1999 and 
by another 15% the year after. By 2004, both armies had cut their forces to a combined 
total of approximately 24,000 active-duty soldiers, supported by some 15,000 reservists 
 and as shown in the graph, in 2016, the army was down to the current 10,5000 soldiers. 
Figure 1: Armed forces personnel, BiH 1996-2016 
The Dayton Peace Agreement left the country more divided than it was before the 
war. It was not just the country that was divided; there were de facto three separate 
armies in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Bosnian Croat, Muslim (Bosniak) and Bosnian Serb 
 – which were integrated neither structurally nor operationally, with no cooperation be-
tween them whatsoever. The international community strove for unification at the level 
of the single state, but the memories of war were still fresh and the judicial proceedings 
related to war crimes perpetrated by one of the armies were still ongoing. It was as late 
as 2004 when the International Court for the former Yugoslavia ruled that the massacre 
of the male inhabitants of the Srebrenica enclave by the Army of Republika Srpska (Vo-
jska Republike Srpske, VRS) constituted a crime of genocide under international law; the 
ruling was then upheld by the International Court of Justice in 2007. In spring 2019, Bos-
nian Serb general Ratko Mladić was sentenced to life in prison for crimes against human-
ity committed during the Bosnian conflict, inter alia in Srebrenica. Milorad Dodik, Serbi-
an member of the tripartite BiH presidency and prominent long-term politician in RS, has 
repeatedly downplayed the Srebrenica massacre, most recently in spring 2019 calling it 
a “fabricated myth”; other Bosnian Serb politicians also denied the genocide, including 
Mladen Grujičić, the current mayor of Srebrenica. Republika Srpska set up a commission to 
establish the “truth” of what occurred; the memories of war were still fresh and present. 
 RS politicians repeatedly claimed there was no will to have joint or unified armed forc-
es and the effort of the international community to establish a single military body in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina seemed utopian. Some even claimed that the time had come to 
recognise the reality of a divided country and a divided military.
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Figure 2: The post-Dayton Command Structure in BiH
International pressure helped the process of unification. In 2003, a Commission for 
Defence Reform was established, and the first law necessary for a single ministry of de-
fence for BiH was adopted. State-level parliamentary oversight was created through the 
establishment of a Defence and Security Committee in the BiH Parliamentary Assembly; 
on the basis of the Commission’s work,1 the White Paper on BiH Defence was released 
in 2005, and further defence legislation was adopted.2 In 2004, the first-ever joint co-
llective exercise was conducted between the Army of RS and the Army of FBiH and the 
whole process of unification was completed around 2006. Thus, the three armies that 
had fought each other were turned into a single multi-ethnic military force, serving the 
state of BiH rather than any particular entity or any of BiH’s three constituent peoples. 
BiH abolished conscription in 2006 and, in the same year, the presidency defined the 
size, structure and locations of the newly created AFBiH.3 
Bosnian Serb Muslim Bosnian Croat Other Total
1992/93 67,000 50,000 50,000 167,000
1995/96 75,000 92,000 50,000 217,000
2000/01 30,000 30,000 10,000 70,000
2013 3,533 (33.6%) 4,826 (45.9%) 2,084 (19.8%) 74 (0.7%) 10,450
2016 3,528 (33.6%) 4,820 (45.9%) 2,079 (19.8%) 73 (0.7%) 10,500
Figure 3: Military Forces in Bosnia and Hercegovina 1992-2013
1  KOMISIJA ZA REFORMU ODBRANE. OSBiH: Jedna vojna sila za 21. vijek. Izvještaj 2005. Sarajevo. http://
www.mod.gov.ba/files/file/dokumenti/Izvjestaj-2005-bs.pdf. 
2  MINISTARSTVO ODBRANE. Bijela knjiga odbrane Bosne i Hercegovine. Sarajevo, Juni 2005, http://www.
mod.gov.ba/files/file/dokumenti/Bijela-knjiga-bs.pdf; MINISTARSTVO ODBRANE. Vojna doktrina. 
Sarajevo undated http://www.mod.gov.ba/files/file/dokumenti/vojnadoktrina/vojnadoktrina.
pdf. All documents related to defence in BiH are available at http://www.mod.gov.ba/dokumenti/
odbrambeni_dokumenti/?id=21743. 
3  MAXWELL, R., OLSEN, J.A. Destination NATO. Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003-13. Royal 
United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies 2013. https://jfcnaples.nato.int/hqsarajevo/
page14313506/destination-nato-english. 
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The AFBiH is not a large military force and according to the latest figures (2018), it has 
just over 10,000 active-duty soldiers, 1,000 civilians and 5,000 reservists. The compos-
ition of the armed forces is based on quotas which are linked to the 1991 census. The 
current military body consists of more than 3,000 Serbs, almost 5,000 Muslims and over 
2,000 Croats. The statistics from 2014 show that women make up 6.6% of the AFBiH 
personnel. Women serving in the ranks of the AFBiH are mostly graduates of civilian 
schools, and obtained further military education through various individual and institu-
tional education programmes. 
The armed forces consist of army, air force and air defence units. The bran-
ches of the AFBiH are: Infantry, Artillery, Air Defence, Armoured Mechanised Units, 
Aviation, Engineering, Communications, NBC protection, Electronic Surveillan-
ce and Defence, Air Surveillance and Rapid Response and Military Intelligence. 
 Compared with other armed forces in the region, the AFBiH is small, and similar in size 
to the armed forces of Slovenia (approx. 7,300 personnel).
Figure 4: Command and Control of the Armed Forces of BiH4
The military structure is divided into operational and administrative commands, while 
all of the command structures are multi-ethnic. The mono-ethnic infantry battalions are 
incorporated into brigades that include battalions from all three constituent nations with 
the requirement that each ethnicity makes up at least 10% of the units.5 The mission of 
AFBiH is defined as: ensuring the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence 
and international legal status of BiH, promoting the BiH foreign policy goals, meeting the 
international commitments of BiH, and protecting BiH nationals. The tasks of the AF-
BiH are listed as: participating in collective security operations, peace and self-defence 
4  MINISTARSTVO ODBRANE BIH. Bjela knjigao dbrane Bosne i Hercegovine. Sarajevo 2005. 
http://www.mod.gov.ba/files/file/dokumenti/Bijela-knjiga-bs.pdf. 
5  BASSUENER, K. The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Unfulfilled promise. Berlin /Sarajevo 2015.
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support operations, including the fight against terrorism, providing military defence to 
BiH and its citizens in case of attack, assisting the civilian authorities in response to na-
tural and other disasters and catastrophes, clearing landmines in BiH, and meeting Bi-
H’s international commitments6 
2 NATO MEMBERSHIP ASPIRATIONS AND AFBIH ENGAGEMENT IN 
BIH AND ABROAD
Nato played a key role in stabilising Bosnia and Herzegovina in the post-conflict era, 
through the deployment of peace-keeping forces over a nine-year period from 1995-
2004 until primary responsibility was handed over to the European Union (EU). In 2003, 
the Presidency of BiH expressed readiness to engage in the process of Euro-Atlantic in-
tegration and actively contribute to collective security. The message consisted of a com-
mitment to include BiH in European and Euro-Atlantic integration and in the Partnership 
for Peace programme, and to implement the required defence system reforms and reor-
ganisation of the armed forces.7 Nato membership was identified as one of the priorities 
of foreign policy, as indicated in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Defence White Paper.
In 2006, BiH joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. An Individual Part-
nership Action Plan (IPAP) was agreed with Nato in 2008; its goal was to bring together 
all the cooperation mechanisms through which the country interacts with the Alliance, 
sharpening the focus of activities to better support domestic reform efforts. Two years 
later, BiH was invited to join the Membership Action Plan; in 2018, Alliance foreign mini-
sters decided that Nato was ready to accept the submission of the country’s first Annual 
National Programme.8 Nato keeps a military headquarters in Sarajevo to assist the Bos-
nian authorities with reforms related to the PfP and Nato integration; its secondary goal 
is to provide logistics and other support to the EU. BiH has also established a diplomatic 
mission at Nato Headquarters as well as a liaison office at the Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe (Shape).
From a historical perspective, the relationship between BiH and Nato is unique. Inte-
gration with Nato and membership of PfP was not viewed positively by all three ethnic 
groups, particularly the Serbs, and certainly not as a historical milestone, which is how it 
has been presented. Nevertheless, without the prospect of Nato membership or inter-
national pressure behind the effort, the country would by no means be willing and able 
to unify its armed forces and to create an integrated defence system for the whole of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
6  MINISTARSTVO ODBRANE I ORUŽANE SNAGE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE. Brošura. Sarajevo 2015,  http://
www.mod.gov.ba/foto2015/1809-Bosanski%20jezik-.pdf. 
7  DEFENCE REFORM COMISSION. Put u partnerství za mir: Izveštaj komisije za reformu u oblasti odbrane. 
Sarajevo 2003. http://www.mod.gov.ba/files/file/dokumenti/Partnerstvo-za-mir-bs.pdf. 
8  NATO. Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2008. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_49127.htm. 
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Despite all of these impediments, the AFBiH has performed admirably both at home 
and abroad in peace-keeping operations. Even prior to unification, the AFBiH was deplo-
yed in Iraq as an all-volunteer force in early 2006. Since 2009, BiH has contributed to the 
Nato-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan as part of the Ger-
man and Danish contingents and, following the disbanding of ISAF at the end of 2014, 
its military has been part of Nato’s Resolute Support Mission (RSM) to provide further 
training, advice and assistance for the Afghan security forces (63 troops out of a total 
of 17,034 provided by 39 contributing nations).9 The AFBiH also performed well during 
the 2014 flood emergency, saving the lives and property of BiH citizens. Their effort 
was praised and their reputation enhanced after the floods. The AFBiH worked closely 
with EUFOR which provided them with helicopters to evacuate people, was involved in 
delivering humanitarian aid and in clean-up activities. However, the natural disaster also 
showed the military’s deficiencies in equipment, training and preparation for situations 
of this kind.10 Another challenge that AFBiH has been facing is demining, since landmi-
nes are still killing people in BiH. 
3 CHALLENGES FOR THE AFBIH
3.1 Internal challenges
One of the first issues the armed forces had to face was property and equipment. The 
only defe3nce premises controlled directly by the state of BiH were the offices occupied 
by the MoD, Joint Staff and Operational Command, and the only equipment consisted of 
the weapons, ammunition and vehicles deployed in Iraq. Everything else was controlled 
by the entities (Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska) and was of a scale suitable for 
much larger forces than AFBiH. Finally it was agreed that the real estate (required for de-
fence purposes) would be transferred from the entities to the state. The arms, weapons 
and equipment (AWE) became the subject of heated discussions, as the international 
community did not want them to fall into the wrong hands. 
In 2008, it was finally agreed that BiH should comply with its obligations under interna-
tional law to minimise the proliferation of AWE, and that weapons and equipment would 
become state property, pending disposal of surplus items. Further discussion focused on 
the disposal of surplus AWE (an estimated 18,000 tons) – Bosnian policy-makers wanted 
9  NATO. RSM. Key facts and figures. 2019. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/
pdf_2019_03/20190305_2019-03-RSM-Placemat.pdf. 
10  EUROPEAN COMMISION. Floods in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2014. http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/
news/bosnia_herzegovina_floods_joint_report_en.pdf; HUSEINBASIC, S. Floods in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Lessons to learn. 2014. https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/majorhazards/activites/2014/
SamirHuseinbqsic_BiH_Floods.pdf. 
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this disposal to occur through sales, while the international community pressed consis-
tently for the dismantling or destruction of surplus items. The final agreement was that 
the state should retain 20% of any profits from sale while the remaining 80% would go to 
the entity originally owning the AWE. This of course proved to be controversial and hard 
to implement given the mutual suspicions of both entities regarding the transparency 
of the disposal process and associated profits. Moreover, another problem, which will 
only emerge in time, is the age of the AWE which raises safety and security concerns, 
including the risk of leakage from storage sites due to the poor storage conditions.11 The 
registration of immovable defence property was also a reason why Nato held up the 
accession process until 2018. Even though Nato decided to move forward, deciding not 
to allow Republika Srpska to block the whole process, the property must still be registe-
red at the federal level for the Membership Action Plan to conclude. 
Experts have emphasised that budget constraints have had an effect on the quality of 
equipment and training: „Only one-third of the engineering equipment is operational by 
peacetime standards, in a war situation it’s a lot more.“12 Azra Mulahasanović, the OSCE 
senior public information officer, stated that „more than 90% of the allocated budget is 
spent on personnel costs (i.e., salaries), only a relatively small portion on maintenance, 
and almost nothing on procurement.“13 Selmo Cikotić, former minister of defence, also 
highlighted the lack of money: ‘BiH’s defence budget, which is around 1% of GDP, is not 
enough – it would have to be doubled to reach Nato standards in this regard.“14 
Some challenges for AFBiH also lie in the system as such and in structural changes. Ma-
rina Pendeš, who was appointed minister of defence in 2015, was charged with negligent 
performance of official duties and with forging documents in 2016. A year later, she was 
acquitted by the court of all charges and remained in post. Many experts agree that the 
continuing politicisation of the army is related not only to the positions in the MoD but 
also to key positions in the structure. Another problem is the constitutional setting, as the 
important posts are all appointed on an ethnic, rather than professional, basis and accor-
ding to links to political parties. The practice of sending Serbs for supplementary training 
in Serbia, Croats to Croatia and Bosniaks to Turkey also reveals the persistent polarisation 
in the army ranks. Some of the experts also described ostentatious displays of religio-
sity for personal advancement. The evidence of religious/party patronage in the army 
emerged when it was leaked that the MoD was funding Hajj pilgrimages to Mecca and 
Orthodox devotional trips to Greece for some AFBiH members.15 All of my interviewees 
stated that ethnic polarisation prevails and that „according to the information available 
to the general public, the army uses nationalistic flags, symbols, heraldic signs and also 
11  MAXWELL, R., OLSEN, J.A. Destination NATO. Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003-13. Royal 
United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies 2013. https://jfcnaples.nato.int/hqsarajevo/
page14313506/destination-nato-english. 
12  BASSUENER, K. The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Unfulfilled promise. Berlin /Sarajevo 2015.
13  MULAHASANOVIĆ, Azra. Senior Public Officer at OSCE.  Questionnaire via email, 26 March 2019, Sarajevo. 
14  CIKOTIĆ, Selmo. Former Minister of Defence. Questionnaire via email, 18 April 2019, Sarajevo. 
15  BASSUENER, K. The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Unfulfilled promise. Berlin /Sarajevo 2015.
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the anthems of other states.“16 Most of the interviewees agreed that they could not ima-
gine the AFBiH instigating destabilisation in BiH, though there was unanimous agreement 
that – should something trigger an armed conflict in BiH – „in this situation three national 
armies would again emerge as BiH is a much more divided society than in 1992“.17
3.2 External drivers – economy, politics and society
Even though the representatives of BiH stress the progress made and the will for a 
peaceful future,18 24 years after signing the Dayton Peace Agreement, the country has 
not recovered from the impact of the war and is still facing the challenges of economic 
transition from a state economy to a free-market one. The budget constraints and the 
demobilisation of the army coincided with high unemployment and difficult re-integra-
tion of ex-combatants into civilian life. Their military background proved to be a disad-
vantage when seeking civilian jobs. The high unemployment rate has also been fed by 
the return of refugees and the minimal opportunities for returnees in the labour market. 
The grey market, unofficial economy and organised crime flourished while pension pay-
ments were delayed – this was made worse by the poor state of the economy overall. 
Last but not least, the country contributed to the export of mercenaries to other parts of 
the world (Bosniaks joined Chechen fighters in 2000 and assisted the Kosovo Liberation 
Army in 1999; Bosnian Serbs assisted Yugoslav security forces in Kosovo in 1998 and 
were also part of the White Legion in Zaire fighting on the side of President Mobutu Sésé 
Seko during the First Congo War in 1996).19 
The political climate in Bosnia and Herzegovina has worsened since the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. The Peace Accords stopped the war which caused a great many casualties, 
but they also created a dysfunctional state, in which part of the population does not 
want to live and where mutual trust has not been established. The government of Re-
publika Srpska has for years ruled out joining Nato and emphasised the 2017 Resolution 
on its military neutrality, pointing to the Nato air campaigns against RS and Serbia re-
spectively during the 1990s. Dodik has been calling for the demilitarisation and neu-
trality of the country while misusing the AFBiH for political purposes. In early 2017, the 
US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control introduced sanctions 
against Dodik, saying he posed a “significant threat to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”20 The sanctions block Dodik’s access to assets and 
16  JOVICIĆ, Dragomir. Interview, October 2018, Sarajevo.  
17  JOVICIĆ, Dragomir. Questionnaire via email. 20 March 2019.  
18  Interview with Selmo Cikotić, former defence minister of BiH, 2013. Available at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=akmi6KDqpVs. 
19  KING, J., DORN, W., HODES, M. An unprecedented experiment: Security sector reform in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bonn 2002. 
20  US EMBASSY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. U.S. Ambassador Cormack’s statement on U.S. sanctions 
against Milorad Dodik. At https://ba.usembassy.gov/information-u-s-sanctions-milorad-dodik/. 
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any interests in property in the US or within US jurisdiction and US citizens are banned 
from engaging in transactions with him. Despite strong lobbying, the sanctions have re-
mained in place. The direct reason for their imposition was the January 9 celebration of 
a public holiday in Republika Srpska.
The controversy arises every year when a military and civilian parade is held in Banja 
Luka to mark the Day of Republika Srpska despite the fact that BiH’s Constitutional Court 
ruled in 2015 that marking this holiday excluded non-Serbian citizens and was therefore 
unconstitutional. The date marks the establishment of Republika Srpska in 1992, as well 
as celebrating the patron saint of RS, St. Stephen. The Republika Srpska authorities con-
tested the decision of the BiH Constitutional Court and called for a referendum in 2016 
in which a majority of RS citizens supported the celebrations. General Sefer Halilović 
of the AFBiH threatened that a conflict would flare up if the referendum was held, and 
his comments were glossed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivica Dačić of Serbia as the 
greatest threat to peace and stability in the region. Bosniak member of the Bosnian Pres-
idency Bakir Izetbegović stated that the referendum was an example of breaching the 
Dayton Agreement.21 Nevertheless, every year, the parade of firefighters, cultural and 
sports groups takes place to celebrate the Day of Republika Srpska and is accompanied 
by an army parade. This is deplored both by the international community and the rep-
resentatives of BiH. Obviously, the presence of a ceremonial unit from the Sixth Infantry 
Brigade of AFBiH is not authorised by the BiH Ministry of Defence but is ordered by the 
chairman of the Presidency of BiH Mladen Ivanić. The MoD has ordered an investigation 
into responsibility for this act.22 As a former minister of defence, Selmo Cikotić, stated in 
an interview: “The influence and control of politics or politicians is the biggest and most 
serious challenge for the functioning and progress of the AFBiH, in both positive and 
negative terms.”23 The nationalistic politics remains one of the main threats for the AF-
BiH and so for the security in BiH as such. The current negotiations between Kosovo and 
Serbia about the border adjustments present a threat for sovereignty of the country and 
could result in strong accent on separatist tendencies in RS, which might be supported 
by Serbia and Russia. 
CONCLUSION – THE UNIFIED ARMED FORCES: MISSION COMPLETED? 
My analysis shows that the process of unifying the AFBiH has been one of the more 
successful of BiH’s achievements, though the armed forces still face many challenges 
21  Šef ratnog štaba: Ako bude referenduma, neće biti RS. 20. 9. 2016. B92. 
https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/ index.php?yyyy=2016 & mm=09&dd=20&nav_
category=167&nav_id=1178741. 
22  Ministarstvo odbrane BiH: Nismo dali odobrenje za ućešce OSBiH u obilježavanju Dana RS-
a. Klix-ba. 9. 1. 2017. https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/ministarstvo-odbrane-bih 
-nismo-dali-odobrenje-za-ucesce-osbih-u-obiljezavanju-dana-rs-a/170109077. 
23  CIKOTIĆ, Selmo. Former minister of defence. Questionnaire via email, 18 April 2019, Sarajevo.
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and constraints. The armed forces were downscaled from 167,000 soldiers to 10,000. 
The unification effort, from three different armies with three different commands to one 
unified body under one common minister of defence, not following either the original 
entities or ethnic lines, is also commendable.
Despite Nato involvement in the Bosnian and Kosovan war against Serbian positions, 
BiH identified Nato membership as a priority of its foreign policy as stated in the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Defence White Paper, irrespective of the fact that Republika Srpska 
opposes that aim. Bosnia and Herzegovina also joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
programme in 2006, while the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) was agreed with 
Nato two years later. In 2018, the Alliance decided that BiH was ready to submit its first 
Annual National Programme, with the ultimate goal of Nato accession. Further success-
es of the AFBiH have included participation in the Nato-led International Security Assis-
tance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and, following the termination of ISAF at the end of 
2014, in Nato’s Resolute Support Mission (RSM). The military was praised both nationally 
and internationally for its actions during the floods in Bosnia in 2014.
The main concerns for the BiH armed forces include the old equipment which raises 
security issues, the economic problems of the country and budget constraints, politicisa-
tion and ethnicisation – while ongoing nationalism and the unsure future of BiH remain 
the greatest external challenges. Only one of my interviewees stated that the armed 
forces could trigger a conflict, while all of the others believed that it was highly un-
likely. Nevertheless, they unanimously stated that, in the event of armed conflict, the 
army would split along ethnic lines and would take part in the conflict. Not surprisingly, 
nationalistic politics remains one of the main threats for the AFBiH and so for security 
in BiH and indeed in the whole region. The developments in Republika Srpska and the 
negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia about border adjustments might result in sepa-
ratism in RS, which might be supported by Serbia and Russia. Nevertheless, to conclude, 
the process of unifying AFBiH has been largely successful, unlike the post-conflict build-
ing reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina at large. Nevertheless, in order to call it a 
success, both processes have to be completed concurrently. There can be no successful 
story to tell about the unification of the Bosnian military without successful post-conflict 
state building in BiH.
This paper was written as part of the research project SIVARBAL (Proposal for a sys-
tem of indicators of early warning of possible crisis situations in the Balkans), funded 
by the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic (defence research programme).
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